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SHIELDING CORPORATE INTERESTS
FROM PUBLIC DISSENT:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
UNDESIRABILITY AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
“ECO-TERRORISM” LEGISLATION
Jared S. Goodman*
INTRODUCTION
Every year, in the United States alone, more than nine billion
animals1 are slaughtered for food.2 More than 100 million are
subjected to painful procedures or toxic exposures in laboratories
on college campuses and research facilities throughout the country
for biomedical research and to test the safety of cosmetics,
household cleaners and other consumer products.3 Hundreds of
millions more are killed or exploited for hunting and entertainment
and to manufacture fur and leather clothing.4 “More than 300
*

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A., Binghamton University,
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and Will Potter for his comprehensive investigative journalism. Special thanks
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1
For the purposes of this Note, the term “animal” will refer to only birds
and nonhuman mammals.
2
See U.S. DEP’ T OF AGRIC., NAT ’ L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV .,
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS VIII-36 (2005), available at http://www.usda.gov/
nass/pubs/agr05/agstats2005.pdf.
3
See Madhusree Mukerjee, Speaking for the Animals, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN , Aug. 2004, at 96–97; In Defense of Animals: The Truth About
Vivisection, http://www.vivisectioninfo.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
4
GARY L. FRANCIONE , INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD
OR THE DOG ? xx–xxi (2000) [hereinafter YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG].
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mammals and birds die each time your heart beats.”5
The magnitude of this institutionalized exploitation leaves
animal rights activists with what may seem to be an unattainable
goal: societal recognition of the inherent value of the lives of
animals. Activists who wish to provide immediate sanctuary to
these animals have begun to employ nonviolent, 6 but often illegal,
tactics against animal enterprises. 7 The goal of these tactics, which
range from demonstrations at the offices and homes of company
officials to property damage, is to inflict economic damage on those
who profit from the exploitation of animals, ultimately making it
unprofitable to continue with their practices.8
Fearing the increasing intensity and effectiveness of the
domestic animal rights movement, various private groups have
urged Congress to broaden the reach and increase the penalties of
existing federal legislation applicable exclusively to animal
advocates.9 One result of this corporate campaign, led primarily by
5

Steven M. Wise, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL
R IGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW D IRECTIONS 19, 19 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005).
6
The definition of “violence” with regards to activism is currently up for
debate. However, for the purposes of this Note, “violence” may be defined as
“physical violence against animals, human or non-.” Posting of Justin
Goodman to Connecticut for Animals, http://connecticutforanimals.blogspot.
com/2007/09/on-non-violent-direct-action.html (Sept. 9, 2007, 01:09 EST)
(citing GENE SHARP, T HERE ARE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES, 1 n.1 (2003)).
Physical obstructions and forms of property destruction that do not carry a
substantial risk of injury will be considered nonviolent direct action and outside
the purview of this framework.
7
The term “animal enterprise” refers to: a commercial or academic
enterprise that uses or sells animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber
production, agriculture, education, research or testing; a zoo, aquarium, animal
shelter, pet store, breeder, furrier, circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive
animal event; or any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural arts
and sciences. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act § 43(d)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 43
(2006).
8
See Animal Liberation Front, The ALF Credo and Guidelines,
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2008).
9
The National Association for Biomedical Research (“NABR”) has been
credited with ensuring the passage of animal enterprise protection legislation
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representatives of the agricultural, biomedical research and
pharmaceutical industries, has been the enactment of the federal
crime of “animal enterprise terrorism.”10 With this legislation, the
government has branded and successfully prosecuted individuals
who have engaged in nonviolent activism as “eco-terrorists.”11
Industry groups have taken full advantage of that characterization
to demonize those who associate with, ideologically support, or
simply refuse to condemn the actions of “eco-terrorists.”12
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of the history
of animal rights theory and the current philosophies behind the
belief that animals should be afforded certain moral and legal rights.
It will also examine the operational methods of animal rights
activists and illustrate their role in achieving this underlying goal.
Part II of this Note will discuss the impropriety of characterizing
activists as “terrorists” in order to promote a particular political
agenda. Part III will outline the measures animal enterprises and
industries involved in animal exploitation have taken to urge the
federal government to put an end to the activist tactics that have
successfully caused them to sustain economic loss. Specifically, it
will examine “animal enterprise terrorism” legislation13 and how it
through Congress. See, e.g., Edward J. Walsh, The Animal Enterprise
Protection Act: A Scientist’s Perspective Brings the Law into Focus,
http://www.naiaonline.org/body/articles/archives/animalenterprise.htm
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2008). NABR is an organization comprised of hundreds of
universities, medical and veterinary schools, health agencies, professional
societies, pharmaceutical companies and other animal research-related firms.
NABR: About Us, http://www.nabr.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
10
See id.; Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43
(West 2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 53–67, 89–114.
12
For example, the Center for Consumer Freedom has accused mainstream
animal advocacy organizations such as the Humane Society of the United States
and the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine of “consorting with
terrorists” for allowing nonviolent direct action organization Hugs For Puppies
to set up an informational table at an animal advocacy conference. Will Potter,
Industry Group Says Mainstream Animal Advocates “Consorting With
Terrorists,” http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/2007/08/15/tafa-terrorists/
(Aug. 15, 2007).
13
Specifically, Part III will analyze the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act,
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006), passed on November 27, 2006, as well as its
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has been used successfully to prosecute the nonviolent activism of
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (“SHAC USA”). Part
III will also discuss the “terrorism enhancement” penalties
applicable to nonviolent activism. Part IV will examine how the
application of such ideology-specific legislation has encroached
upon traditionally protected speech. Finally, Part V concludes that
“animal enterprise terrorism” legislation should be a concern not
only of animal rights activists, but of all advocates of social or
political change because of a subsequent chilling effect on the
exercise of free speech.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Animal Rights Theory

Animal advocacy can be traced as far back as the sixth century
B.C. when Greek philosopher Pythagoras urged respect for animals
because he believed in the transmigration of souls between human
and nonhuman animals.14 In the 18th century, English philosopher
and legal theorist Jeremy Bentham rejected the position that
because nonhuman animals allegedly lack rationality or the ability
to communicate using language, humans may use them as a means
to their own desired ends and owe them no moral obligations. 15
Instead, Bentham suggested that the primary characteristic relevant
to the attribution of moral consideration is sentience, i.e., the
ability to experience sensation or feeling.16
precursor, the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43
(West 2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006).
14
ANGUS TAYLOR, ANIMALS AND ETHICS 34 (2003) (“Pythagoras . . .
rejected the claim that we have nothing significant in common with animals and
therefore cannot be said to treat them unjustly. [He] . . . believed that animals
may be former human beings, now reincarnated in non-human form.”).
15
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 283 n.b (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press
1996) (1789).
16
T HE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 2000). In suggesting that the mistreatment of nonhuman animals was
akin to the evils of racial discrimination, Bentham stated:
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However, it was not until 1983 that a thorough argument in
favor of animal rights was presented by American philosopher
Tom Regan in his book, The Case for Animal Rights.17 The general
theory of animal rights is based upon the premise that
individualshuman and non-human animalsare due equal respect
for their equal inherent value.18 To Regan, the fundamental attribute
all humans share is that each of us is the “subject-of-a-life;” that is,
a conscious creature with an individual welfare important to us,
logically independent of our usefulness to anyone else.19 Humans
have, inter alia, beliefs and desires, perception, memory, a sense of
the future, feelings of pain and pleasure, preference- and welfareinterests, and the ability to act in furtherance of those goals.20
Regan argues that because the same is true of certain animals, such
as mammals aged one year or more, they too are subjects-of-a-life
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the
caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the
number of the legs, [or] the villosity of the skin . . . are reasons equally
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate? [A] full
grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a
more conversible animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a
month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail?
[T]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can
they suffer?
BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 283 n.b.
17
T OM REGAN , T HE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983). Prior to the
1970’s, animal advocacy was largely concerned with the welfare of animals.
Animal welfare, as opposed to animal rights, “concerns the treatment of animals
and has as its central focus the regulation of animal exploitation. Animal welfare
maintains that it is acceptable to use nonhumans as long as we treat them
‘humanely.’” Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach—
Mission
Statement
[hereinafter
The
Abolitionist
Approach],
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/index.php?page_id=54 (list visited Feb.
21, 2008).
18
See, e.g., The Abolitionist Approach, supra note 17 (“[A]ll sentient
beings should have at least one right—the right not to be treated as property. If
we recognized this one right, we would be compelled to abolish
institutionalized animal exploitation.”).
19
REGAN , supra note 17, at 243.
20
Id.
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with their own inherent value.21 Finally, it follows that the basic
moral right of all who possess inherent value is the right never to be
harmed “on the grounds that all those affected by the outcome will
thereby secure ‘the best’ aggregate balance of intrinsic values (e.g.,
pleasures) over intrinsic disvalues (e.g., pains).”22
Similarly, law professor Gary Francione maintains that true
recognition of animal rights requires the complete abolition of
animal exploitation.23 However, contrary to Regan, Francione
argues that a theory of abolition should not require that animals
have any cognitive characteristic beyond sentience to be full
members of the moral community, entitled to the basic moral right
not to be the property of humans.24 Francione’s theory has three
components: first, society regards it as a moral imperative to
protect all humans from the suffering caused by being used
exclusively as the resource of another; second, animals and humans
are similar in that they are sentient beings; and third, if animal
interests in not suffering are to be morally significant, then the
principle of equal consideration demands that we extend the basic
right not to be treated as things to animals.25 Simply, if animal
interests are to be taken seriously, we must treat their similar
interests in a similar fashion.26
Thus, because the theory of animal rights rejects treating
animals as property, it “rejects completely the institutionalized
exploitation of animals, which is made possible only because
animals have property status.”27 The theory ensures that relevant
animal interests are completely protected and not sacrificed for
21

Id. at 78. This concept is further illustrated by the inherent value ascribed
to humans who are not capable of rational thought, such as the infants referred to
by Bentham and the severely mentally impaired. See BENTHAM , supra note 15,
at 283 n.b.
22
REGAN , supra note 17, at 286.
23
Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in A NIMAL R IGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW D IRECTIONS 108, 108 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005).
24
Id. at 121, 124–25.
25
YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG , supra note 4, at xxvi.
26
Id. at 99.
27
GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN W ITHOUT T HUNDER: T HE IDEOLOGY OF
THE ANIMAL R IGHTS MOVEMENT 2 (1996).
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human benefit, no matter how “humane” the exploitation or how
stringent the safeguards from “unnecessary suffering.”28 To deny
animals this one basic right would be speciesist 29a prejudice
which, like racism or sexism, is based upon a morally irrelevant
physical characteristic. “It is a bias, arbitrary as any other.”30
B. Direct Action and the Role of Animal Advocates
Just as nineteenth-century white abolitionists in the
[United States] worked across racial lines to create new
forms of solidarity, so the new freedom fighters reach
across species lines to help our fellow beings in the animal
world.31
When conventional methods of achieving social and political
change are believed to be slow and inadequate, activists often
employ direct action tactics.32 “[D]irect action seeks to create such
a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has
constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.”33
28

Id.
Speciesism is defined as “Human intolerance or discrimination on the
basis of species, especially as manifested by cruelty to or exploitation of
animals.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE D ICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 2000).
30
Wise, supra note 5, at 26.
31
Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella II, Behind the Mask: Uncovering the
Animal Liberation Front, in T ERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS 9, 12 (Steven
Best & Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2004). Steven Best is Associate Professor of
Humanities and Philosophy at the University of Texas, El Paso, and is cofounder and Chief Editor of the peer-reviewed online journal, Critical Animal
Studies Journal. Dr. Steve Best, Biography, http://www.drstevebest.org/
InPages/Personal.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
32
Examples of conventional, indirect methods of affecting change are
collecting signatures on a petition, writing letters to representatives in office, or
voting for those who assure the public that they will provide a remedy at some
point in the future if elected.
33
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963),
available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/popular_requests/frequentdocs/
birmingham.pdf.
29
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These tactics are intended to have an immediate impact on a
problem or its causes, and can include legal and illegal activities,
such as demonstrations, boycotts, civil disobedience, vandalism
and property damage.34
In the animal rights context, activists often resort to illegal
direct action because conventional advocacy alone is insufficient to
rescue the countless animals facing present dangers.35 Activists
have resorted to illegal actions because of the substantial cultural,
political, economic, legal, and psychological impediments to their
agenda of abolishing institutionalized animal oppression and
obtaining moral rights for animals.36
There are three specific fundamental obstacles that preclude
successful advocacy through legal means.37 First, although there are
laws in the United States aimed at regulating animal usage, they
rarely go beyond prescribing minimal guidelines to ensure that
animals are used efficiently.38 Because animals are considered
private property, their interests are always secondary to those of
their owners.39 Second, despite the weakness of animal protection
laws, many activists attempt to use these laws to effect change.40
However, legal advocacy is rarely successful in obtaining
protection for animals because activists typically lack legal
standing to litigate the specific instances of cruelty that fall within
the purview of the legislation.41 Finally, and perhaps most
34

See Pattrice Jones, Mothers with Monkeywrenches: Feminist Imperatives
and the ALF, in T ERRORISTS OR FREEDOM F IGHTERS 137, 137–38 (Steven Best
& Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2004).
35
Laura G. Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the
Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L. REV . 765, 781 (1995).
36
Id. at 796.
37
Id. at 781.
38
YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG , supra note 4, at 10.
39
See id. at 10.
40
Kniaz, supra note 35, at 794.
41
Standing is a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial
enforcement of a duty or right. BLACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). For
examples of cases where the lack of standing has been a procedural bar to
bringing claims for violations of animal protection legislation, see, e.g.,
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (In declining to
grant the cetaceans standing to bring suit in their own name under the
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importantly, “animal enterprises wield extraordinary cultural and
political power in the United States.”42 Enormous transnational
industries are involved in raising and killing billions of animals for
food, clothing, product testing, biomedical research, and
entertainment each year.43 Today, products that result from animal
exploitation are so abundant that it is nearly impossible to live
without supporting the abuse of animals in some fashion, whether
directly or indirectly.44
As a result of the limitations of legal activism for animals, illegal
direct action is sometimes perceived as the most effective method
of animal rights advocacy. The Animal Liberation Front (“ALF”), a
decentralized conglomerate of small autonomous groups, is among
the most notorious for employing illegal direct action as its primary
method of abolishing the property status of animals.45 Any
individual may regard him/herself as part of the ALF so long as
he/she carries out his/her actions in accordance with ALF
guidelines:
1. TO liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e.
laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc, and place them in
good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free
Endangered Species Act, the court stated that “[i]f Congress and the President
intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people
and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly.”)
(quoting Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. The New
England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1993)); Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (animal welfare
organization denied standing to bring action against the United States
Department of Agriculture, challenging regulations promulgated under Animal
Welfare Act); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (third parties do not have standing to challenge a rule indicating that
genetically engineered animals are patentable subject matter).
42
Kniaz, supra note 35, at 781.
43
See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
44
Wise, supra note 5, at 20.
45
See Addressing the Threat of Animal Rights Extremism and EcoTerrorism: Hearing Before the S.Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 109th
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Hearing] (testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy
Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
congress/congress05/lewis051805.htm (declaring the ALF “[o]ne of today’s
most serious domestic terrorism threats”).
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from suffering.
2. TO inflict economic damage to those who profit from the
misery and exploitation of animals.
3. TO reveal the horror and atrocities committed against
animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent
direct actions and liberations.
4. TO take all necessary precautions against harming any
animal, human and non-human.
5. TO analyze the ramifications of all proposed actions, and
never apply generalizations when specific information is
available.46
The ALF’s short-term goal is “to save as many animals as
possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse,” while
their long term intention is to end all animal suffering by making it
unprofitable for companies engaging in animal abuse to remain in
business. 47 ALF activists often force entry into animal enterprise
facilities that confine animals in order to release48 or rescue them.49
They typically operate at night, wearing balaclavas and in small
groups of people.50 After removing animals from these facilities,
ALF activists seize or destroy equipment and other property that
has been used to exploit animals, and they sometimes use arson to
destroy buildings and laboratories.51 “They have cost the animal
exploitation industries hundreds of millions of dollars. They
willfully break the law, because the law wrongly consigns animals
to cages and confinement, to loneliness and pain, to torture and
death.” 52

46

Animal Liberation Front, supra note 8.
Id.
48
Mink or coyotes are released from confinement and left to acclimate to the
wild. Best & Nocella, supra note 31, at 11.
49
Cats, dogs, mice, and guinea pigs are not merely released, but rescued
and taken with activists. Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
47
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II. ACTIVISTS AS “T ERRORISTS”
[M]ost Americans would not consider the harassment of
animal testing facilities to be “terrorism,” any more than
they would consider anti-globalization protestors or antiwar protestors or women’s health activists to be
terrorists.53
- Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has branded direct
action by animal and environmental activists “eco-terrorism.”54 It
defines eco-terrorism as “the use or threatened use of violence of a
criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an
environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmentalpolitical reasons . . . .”55 This characterization of violence is
troublesome because the government, motivated by politics and the
ideological biases of lawmakers, has singled out property crimes
committed by these activists. 56 The fundamental disparity between
standard criminal behavior and direct action on behalf of animals or
the environment is that the latter is adverse to corporate interests
53

Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Vt.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_
statement.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=2629.
54
Henry Schuster, Domestic Terror: Who’s Most Dangerous?, CNN , Aug.
14, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/08/24/schuster.column/index.html.
55
The Threat of Eco-Terrorism: Hearing Before the H. Res. Subcomm. on
Forests and Forest Health, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Hearing]
(testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism Sec. Chief, FBI), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm.
56
See, e.g., ROBERT F. K ENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE 5
(2004).
Almost all the top positions at the agencies that protect our
environment and oversee our resources have been filled by former
lobbyists for the biggest polluters in the very businesses that these
ministries oversee. These men and women seem to have entered
government service with the express purpose of subverting the agencies
they now command.
Id.
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and consequently threatens the political status quo.57
In 2005, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
met to discuss the alleged threat posed by these “eco-terrorists,” as
well as the measures the federal government is taking to “detect,
disrupt, and dismantle the animal rights and environmental
extremist movements.”58 Addressing the committee, FBI Deputy
Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division John E. Lewis
declared that “[o]ne of today’s most serious domestic terrorism
threats come from special interest extremist movements such as the
Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF),
and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign.”59 In
fact, Lewis has stated that “[t]he No. 1 domestic terrorism threat is
the eco-terrorism, animal-rights movement.”60 Contrary to what
these remarks may suggest, however, the ALF, which is generally
cited as the archetype of eco-terrorism, explicitly denounces
violence against both human and nonhuman animals. 61
In light of the FBI’s classification of animal rights activists as
the nation’s top priority of domestic terrorism, “Americans should
question whether the Justice Department is making America’s far57

Industry lobbying to Congress and federal agencies has undoubtedly
played a significant part in the classification of direct action as “terrorism.” For
example, the American Medical Association and the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of Americatwo representatives of the pharmaceutical
industry and its unwavering commitment to animal experimentationrank
among the top five spenders in the country in governmental lobbying.
Combined, they have spent almost $300,000,000 between 1998 and 2007.
Opensecrets.org, Lobbying Spending Database, http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobbyists/index. asp?txtindextype=s (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
58
2005 Hearing, supra note 45 (testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy
Assistant Dir., Counterterrorism Div., FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
congress/congress05/lewis051805.htm.
59
Id.
60
Schuster, supra note 54 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that Lewis
and other governmental agents consistently refer to these activist organizations
as “eco-terrorists” and “violent,” while failing to mention that “not a single
incident of so-called [eco-terrorism] has killed anyone.” Steven Best, Showtrials
and Scarecrows: “Ecoterrorism” and the War on Dissent, IMPACT PRESS,
Summer 2005, http://www.impactpress.com/articles/summer05/bestsummer05.
html (quoting Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ)).
61
Animal Liberation Front, supra note 8.
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right fanatics a serious priority.”62 For example, on an internal list
of threats to the nation’s security, the Department of Homeland
Security does not list anti-government groups, white supremacists
and other radical movements that have staged various terrorist
attacks and have killed hundreds of Americans.63 Criticizing the
politically charged use of terrorist discourse, the Southern Poverty
Law Center has pointed out that “for all the property damage they
have wreaked, eco-radicals have killed no one—something that
cannot be said of the white supremacists and others who people
the American radical right.”64 Between 1995 and 2005, white
supremacist and other extremist groups produced 60 terrorist
plots, including plans to bomb or burn government buildings,
abortion clinics, places of worship, and bridges; assassinate police
officers, judges, politicians, civil rights figures and abortion
providers; and stockpile illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives,
and biological and chemical weapons. 65
Given the demonstrated violent propensities of many of the
country’s extremist groups and the government’s subsequent focus
on animal and environmental rights activists, it is evident that the
priorities of federal law enforcement have become misplaced. After
168 individuals were killed and over 800 injured in the Oklahoma
City attack by anti-government militia sympathizers Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, a Justice Department official stated,
62

Daniel Levitas, Our Enemies at Home, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at

A19.
63

Justin Rood, Animal Rights Groups and Ecology Militants Make DHS
Terrorist List, Right-Wing Vigilantes Omitted (Mar. 25, 2005),
http://www.cq.com/public/20050325_homeland.html.
64
Southern Poverty Law Center, Decade of domestic terror documented by
Center (Sept. 2005), http://www.splcenter.org/center/splcreport/article.jsp?aid=
164.
65
Andrew Blejwas et al., Southern Poverty Law Center, Terror From the
Right, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Summer 2005, http://www.splcenter.org/intel/
intelreport/article.jsp?aid=549. Since 1993, anti-abortion extremists alone have
murdered seven abortion providers, attempted fifteen murders, mailed 656
anthrax threats, and engaged in hundreds of other instances of physical violence.
National Abortion Federation, Violence and Disruption Statistics (Aug. 31,
2007), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_
abortion/violence_statistics.pdf.
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“Unfortunately, keeping track of right-wing and neo-Nazi hate
groups isn’t necessarily a path to career advancement in the
Bureau.”66 Under pressure from the White House and conservative
Republicans, national security organizations have made the
troubling political decision to discount the life-threatening violence
emanating from Americans on the far-right fringe, and instead focus
on nonviolent activist groups.67
III. “ECO-TERRORISM” LEGISLATION AND ITS A P PLICATION
A. The Animal Enterprise Protection Act
As a response to the increase in effective direct action activism,
Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992
(“AEPA”).68 This legislation, shepherded by the National
Association for Biomedical Research,69 created the crime of “animal
enterprise terrorism.”70 In doing so, it amended federal criminal law
to provide a fine, up to one year in prison, or both, for anyone who
intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning
of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging,
or causing the loss of, any property (including animals or
records) used by the animal enterprise, and thereby causes
economic damage exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise, or
conspires to do so.”71
The AEPA also provided for increased imprisonment penalties of
66

Levitas, supra note 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Schuster, supra note 54.
68
Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006).
69
Steven
Best,
New,
Improved,
and
ACLU
Approved,
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/AgainstALF/AETANew.htm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
70
Marjorie A. Berger, ed., 2006 Legislative Review, 13 ANIMAL L. 299,
301 (2007).
71
Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006).
67
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up to ten years if a violation results in serious bodily injury to an
individual and life in prison if a violation results in death.72
The AEPA was not used until September 16, 1998, when a
federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted activists Peter Young and
Justin Samuel for, inter alia, animal enterprise terrorism.73 The
indictment alleged their connection to a raid of fur farms in the
Midwest in October 1997, in which an estimated 8,000 to 12,000
mink were released from five mink farms over a two week period.74
In 2000, after Samuel was apprehended in Belgium and
subsequently extradited to the United States, he entered a plea
agreement with federal prosecutors to implicate Young in exchange
for a lighter sentence.75 Samuel pled guilty to two misdemeanor
offenses under the AEPA,76 and was sentenced to two years in
prison and ordered to pay over $360,000 in fines. 77
On March 31, 2005, Young was arrested after seven years of
FBI pursuit. 78 After rejecting various plea deals in exchange for
becoming an undercover agent in the animal rights movement or
providing investigators with the names of other activists, the
government dropped four of the felony counts and Young
eventually pled guilty to the remaining animal enterprise terrorism

72

Id.
2002 Hearing, supra note 55 (testimony of James F. Jarboe, Domestic
Terrorism Sec. Chief, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/
congress02/jarboe021202.htm.
74
SupportPeter.com, Background Information, http://web.archive.org/web/
20070429230300/http://www.supportpeter.com/background.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008). Justin Samuel testified before a federal grand jury that he and
Young cut the perimeter fence of the mink farm, entered the barn type structures
in which the mink were kept, and opened the cages for the mink to escape.
SupportPeter.com, Justin Samuel’s 2000 Grand Jury Transcripts, http://web.
archive.org/web/20070103160201/http://supportpeter.com/jstestimony2.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
75
SupportPeter.com, Background Information, supra note 74.
76
Kevin Murphy, Washington State Man Admits Releasing Hundreds of
Minks by Cutting Fences, M ILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL , Aug. 31, 2000, at B2.
77
Will Potter, Animal Enterprise Protection Act, http://www.
greenisthenewred.com/blog/aepa/ (July 29, 2006).
78
SupportPeter.com, Background Information, supra note 74.
73
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charges under the AEPA.79 He received a sentence of two years in
federal prison, 360 hours of community service at a charity to
benefit “humans and no other species,” $254,000 restitution, and
one year probation.80
Despite these sentences, industry groups pushed for
expansions of “animal enterprise terrorism” legislation, alleging that
the AEPA was an ineffective prosecutorial tool due to the limited
penalties available for violations and its sparing application.81 In
response to the heavy lobbying from animal-testing firms and
pharmaceutical companies, Congress amended various provisions
of the AEPA in 2002.82
While opponents of animal enterprise terrorism legislation take
little issue with Congress’ decision to increase the maximum prison
sentence for causing serious bodily injury,83 the expansion of the
scope of the statute and the increased penalties for nonviolent
actions are much more controversial.84 This 2002 revision
eliminated the requirement that economic damage to an animal
enterprise must exceed $10,000, thereby providing a federal cause
of action for even minimal economic loss.85 The newly created
remedy for “economic damage,” defined as damage “not exceeding
$10,000 to an animal enterprise,” consisted of a fine, maximum
imprisonment of six months, or both.86 Further, “major economic
damage,” defined as “economic damage exceeding $10,000 to an
animal enterprise,” could result in a fine and imprisonment of up to
three years, tripling the maximum sentence previously permitted
79

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81
See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 9 (“Penalties attached to crimes committed
against businesses and laboratories are appropriate, by some minimal definition,
and, simultaneously, they are glaringly ineffective. This paradox constitutes the
most serious practical problem confronting the Act’s utility as either a deterrent
to terrorism or a prosecutorial tool.”).
82
The Public Heath Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–188, sec. 336, § 43(a) (2002) (amending the Animal
Enterprise Protection Act of 1992).
83
Pub. L. 107-188, sec. 336(b), § 43(b)(3) (2002).
84
Id. § 43(b).
85
Id. § 43(b)(1).
86
Id.
80
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under the Act. 87 Lastly, this revision included a catch-all category
for restitution, authorizing such an order “for any other economic
damage resulting from the offense.”88 Thus, the legislation
addressed the concerns of lobbyists, increasing scope of the Act
and the penalties applicable to offenses that constitute “animal
enterprise terrorism.”
B. The Case of the SHAC 7
Since 1999, animal rights activists have waged an aggressive
direct action campaign and utilized high-pressure tactics to
advocate the closure of Huntingdon Life Sciences (“HLS”). HLS is
a contract research laboratory 89 with facilities in New Jersey and
England that purportedly kills 180,000 animals per year to test
pharmaceutical products, pesticides, industrial and other
chemicals.90 This international campaign, known as Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (“SHAC”), has targeted HLS because
five undercover investigations at the labs have revealed appalling
87

Id. § 43(b)(2). Prior to this amendment, the AEPA provided that an
individual could be imprisoned for up to one year for economic damage
exceeding $10,000. Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. §
43 (West 2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006).
88
Pub. L. 107-188, sec. 336(c)(3), § 43(c) (2002). The previous text of the
AEPA provided restitution only for: (1) “the reasonable cost of repeating any
experimentation that was interrupted or invalidated as a result of the offense”;
and (2) “the loss of food production or farm income reasonable attributable to
the offense.” Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43 (West
2008) (amended 1996, 2002 & 2006).
89
A “[c]ontract research organization . . . assumes, as an independent
contractor with the sponsor, one or more of the obligations of a sponsor, e.g.,
design of a protocol, selection or monitoring of investigations, evaluation of
reports, and preparation of materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2008). Companies often outsource
various forms of testing to contract research laboratories for products such as
“pharmaceuticals, food additives and a variety of crop protection and consumer
chemicals.” Huntingdon Life Sciences, Company Overview, http://
www.huntingdon.com/index.php?currentNumber=0&currentIsExpanded=0 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2008).
90
Barbara Stagno, Life Science or Living Hell?, SATYA , Nov./Dec. 2000,
accessed at http://www.satyamag.com/novdec00/stagno.html.
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acts of animal cruelty and countless violations of the Animal
Welfare Act. 91 Video footage obtained during those investigations
showed workers punching beagle puppies in the face, dissecting
live monkeys and falsifying scientific data.92
SHAC activists campaigning against HLS in the United States
developed methodological approaches to activism that were new to
the animal rights movement, as well as to social justice movements
in general.93 They utilized direct action tactics, the internet, an
understanding of the legal system, and a singular focus on
eliminating HLS as a primary representative of the evils of the
vivisection industry. 94 These strategies resulted in the creation of
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA (“SHAC USA”), an
incorporated organization whose sole purpose was to provide
information, distinct from the SHAC campaign in which activists
participate in both legal and illegal forms of direct action.95
Fundamentally, SHAC USA merely operated a website that
provided information and ideological support for protest activity
against HLS, and significantly, its business affiliates.96 “By
maintaining [this] vital distinction . . . SHAC . . . pushed the
political envelope as a movement while technically remaining
within its rights as an organization.”97
91

For more information on HLS and a video that was filmed during one of
the undercover investigations, see SHAC7.com, HLS & Vivisection,
http://www.shac7.com/hls.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
92
Id. A recent lawsuit filed by a former HLS employee alleges that he was
fired without explanation in 2005 after refusing “to change his interpretation of
research data to show a test resulted in a success instead of the actual failure” so
the company would be able to continue billing its clients for further unnecessary
testing. Ken Serrano, Suit Cites False-Data Desires, Racial Bias at Lab, HOME
NEWS TRIB., Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.thnt.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=
/20071104/NEWS/711040457/1001.
93
See Steven Best and Richard Kahn, Trial By Fire: The SHAC7,
Globalization, and the Future of Democracy, 2 ANIMAL LIBERATION PHIL .
AND P OL ’ Y J. 1, 1 (2004).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 18.
96
SHAC7.com, The Case, http://www.shac7.com/case.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2008).
97
Best & Kahn, supra note 93, at 18.
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However, on May 26, 2004, disregarding the distinction
between SHAC USA and the SHAC direct action campaign, federal
agents descended upon six animal rights activists involved with
SHAC USA with guns drawn and helicopters over head.98 These
activists, along with the SHAC USA organization, have come to be
known as the SHAC 7.99
The SHAC 7 were indicted by a New Jersey grand jury on
federal charges alleging they had orchestrated an interstate
campaign of terrorism and intimidation, amounting to a conspiracy
to violate the AEPA.100 These charges were based solely on the
existence of the SHAC USA website, which contained home
addresses and other personal information about Huntingdon Life
Sciences employees, associates, and their family members, as well
as news and anonymous communiqués submitted by activists that
did engage in direct action.101 However, the creators of the site and
the organization did not advocate any particular direct action
tactics or direct action in general.102 In fact, the bottom of each page
on the website contained a disclaimer which read: “[SHAC USA
does] not advocate any form of violent activity, and in fact . . .
urge[s] people that when they write letters or they send emails,
that they’re polite, they’re to the point, they’re not threatening in
nature.”103 Instead, the website was meant to remind those who
opposed the practices at HLS that the company’s employees and
affiliates were supporting its existence, without which it could no
longer operate.104
98

See id., at 1; Chris Maag, America’s #1 Threat, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 1,
2006, at 18.
99
The SHAC 7 consists of: Kevin Kjonaas, Lauren Gazzola, Jacob Conroy,
Darius Fullmer, Andrew Stepanian, and Joshua Harper. John McGee, a seventh
activist, was also charged originally but was later dropped from the case.
SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96.
100
Id.
101
Telephone Interview by Amy Goodman of Democracy Now! with
Andrew Stepanian, member of the SHAC 7, and Andrew Erba, a lead attorney in
the SHAC 7 case (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Democracy Now! Interview],
available at http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/10/03/142235.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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The activists denied any involvement with the vandalism,
threats, and other forms of direct action that were subsequently
carried out against Huntingdon Life Sciences employees and
insisted they were “simply trying to shame their targets into
dissociating themselves from the company . . . .”105 In fact, federal
prosecutors failed to introduce any evidence that the individual
defendants or the organization directly participated in any direct
action.106 Instead, the government argued to jurors that the
information contained on the SHAC USA website enabled activists
to target those affiliated with the company and incited illegal direct
action.107
The government attempted to attribute to the SHAC 7 the
violence that did occur as part of the campaign to close HLS.108
Various government witnesses testified about the protest activity
and criminal actions carried out against HLS, its employees, and its
affiliates.109 However, the one significant commonality among the
testimony of the government’s witnesses is that none were able to
identify any of the defendants as activists who engaged in criminal
acts against them.110
Nonetheless, on March 2, 2006, after fourteen hours of
deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. 111
All six defendants were found guilty of “[c]onspiracy to violate the
Animal Enterprise Protection Act”112 and became the first
105

David Kocieniewski, Six Animal Rights Activists are Convicted of
Terrorism, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at B3.
106
Id.
107
Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office—District of New Jersey,
Militant Animal Rights Group, Six Members Convicted in Campaign to
Terrorize
Company,
Employees
and
Others
(Mar.
2,
2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/shac0302_r.htm
[hereinafter
U.S.
Attorney’s Press Release].
108
SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96.
109
Id. Among the witnesses was HLS director Brian Cass, who resides in
the United Kingdom. Id. Cass testified about the campaign against the company
in England, an attack on him in England in 2001, and the alleged benefits that
result from the animal research conducted by the company. Id.
110
Id.
111
Kocieniewski, supra note 105.
112
U.S. Attorney Press Release, supra note 107. The six charges were as
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individuals to be found guilty of animal enterprise terrorism.113 The
activists were sentenced to between one and six years in federal
prison, and the organization received five years probation and was
ordered to pay a restitution of $1,000,001 to HLS, the
responsibility of which belonged to the individual defendants.114
C. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
The SHAC campaign was largely effective due to its innovative
strategy of demonstrating against “tertiary” targets, such as the
investors, insurers, and suppliers that support HLS and enable it to
operate profitably but which cannot themselves be considered
“animal enterprises.”115 Seemingly disregarding that the AEPA had
been successfully used to prosecute individuals involved in this
campaign that did not personally engage in direct action, animal
industry groups once again pushed for broader legislation and
greater maximum sentences than those available in the recently
amended legislation.116 These efforts are illustrative of the driving
force behind the enactment of animal enterprise legislation; that is,
follows: count one, conspiracy to violate the AEPA; count two, conspiracy to
commit interstate stalking; counts three, four and five, interstate stalking of
specific victims; and count six, conspiracy to use a telecommunications device
to abuse, threaten and harass persons. Id. Kjonaas, Gazzola, and Conroy were
found guilty of all counts, Harper of counts one and six, and Stepanian and
Fuller only of conspiracy to violate the AEPA. Id.
113
SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96. Until 2004, the AEPA had
only been used to secure the guilty pleas of Peter Young and Justin Samuel, and
no defendant charged with a violation had been to trial. See id.
114
See Laura Mansnerus, Animal Rights Advocates Given Prison Terms,
N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at B8 (Judge Anne E. Thompson sentenced
Kjonaas to six years, Gazzola to four years and four months, and Conroy to four
years in prison); Trenton: Activist Sentenced, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at
B4 (Harper was sentenced to three years); Will Potter, Remaining SHAC 7
Defendants Sentenced, http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/2006/09/19/
remaining-shac-7-defendants-sentenced/ (Sept. 19, 2006) (Stepanian was
sentenced to three years and Fullmer to twelve months and one day).
115
Best & Kahn, supra note 93, at 17.
116
See, e.g., 2004 Hearing, supra note 53 (testimony of William Green,
Senior V.P. and General Counsel, Chiron Corporation), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3462.
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industry groups are not concerned with further criminalizing those
acts that are already illegal for criminal justice purposes, but
instead are urging the federal government to shield their corporate
interests entirely from opposition.117
On May 18, 2004, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held
a hearing on “Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality,” where
government officials, corporate executives and animal
experimenters met to discuss the perceived need for stronger
legislation.118 The proposed amendments included a provision to
prohibit causing economic loss, even in the absence of any physical
destruction; expanding the act to include tertiary targets; expanding
the definition of “animal enterprise” to include the use of animals
“for education . . . [and] for the purpose of advancing biomedical
sciences;” and increasing the maximum prison sentence to ten years
for physical or economic disruption.119 John E. Lewis, the FBI
Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division,
argued to the committee that these measures were necessary
because “[w]hile it is a relatively simple matter” to prosecute
activists who allegedly commit arson or use explosive devices
under existing federal statutes, “it is often difficult if not
impossible to address a campaign of low-level . . . criminal activity
like that of SHAC in federal court.”120
However, the indictment of the SHAC 7 just two days after
this committee hearing, and their subsequent conviction,
117

William Green of Chiron Corp., a biotechnology company that had
contracted with HLS to conduct primate and other animal testing, urged
Congress to adopt further means by which to prosecute animal rights activists,
because “[a]s the law presently stands, tools are insufficient.” Id. In support of
this assertion, he noted that “Chiron Corporation and its employees have been
the target of a . . . campaign by animal rights extremists” that has cost the
company “significant time and resources to defend [itself]; resources that [it]
believe[s] would have been better invested in [its] research efforts.” Id.
118
2004 Hearing, supra note 53.
119
Id. (testimony of William Green, Senior V.P. and General Counsel,
Chiron Corporation), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3462.
120
Id. (testimony of John E. Lewis, Deputy Assistant Dir.,
Counterterrorism Div., FBI), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3460.
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demonstrates that the AEPA was sufficient to prosecute
defendants. The legislation was interpreted so broadly as to
encompass nonviolent actions that cannot be incorporated into any
traditional framework of criminal activity.121 Therefore, the
adoption of any amendments to expand the reach of and increase
penalties under the AEPA was unnecessary, and the claim that
existing federal legislation was insufficient to prosecute those who
demonstrate against secondary targets was illogical.
During the first session of the 109th Congress in 2005, Senator
James Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Representative Thomas Petri (R-WI)
introduced early versions of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
(“AETA”) as an amendment to the AEPA.122 This legislation,
drafted with assistance from the Department of Justice and the
FBI, was meant to “enhance the effectiveness of the U.S.
Department of Justice’s response to recent trends in the animal
rights terrorist movement.”123 The bill addressed the concerns being
voiced by industry groups, incorporating provisions to enhance the
protection of corporate interests. 124 No action was taken on the bill
during that session other than referral to committee.125 Inhofe and
Petri introduced the final version of the bill to Congress in 2006.126
Throughout this process, animal advocacy and civil rights
organizations expressed their opposition to the AETA to the
121

See infra text accompanying notes 224–55 (concluding that the
activities of the SHAC 7 were entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment).
122
Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public
Works, Inhofe Introduces Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (Oct. 28, 2005),
http://epw.senate.gov/pressitem.cfm?party=rep&id=247941.
123
Id.
124
Incorporating the provisions recommended by industry groups expanded
the scope and increased the penalties of animal enterprise terrorism legislation,
providing greater protections to those encompassed by the Act. See infra text
accompanying notes 141–51. “No other industrial sector in U.S. history has
ever been given such legal protections against people’s exercising of their First
Amendment free-speech rights.” PETA, Tell Congress That Exposing Animal
Abuse Is Not Illegal!, http://www.peta.org/Automation/AlertItem.asp?id=2032
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
125
Berger, supra note 70, at 300.
126
Id. at 300–01.
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House Judiciary Committee.127 These organizations cautioned that
the AETA’s characterization of the loss of property 128 could
potentially infringe upon constitutionally protected forms of
activism such as demonstrations, leafleting, undercover
investigations, and boycotts. 129 They argued that the bill contained
vague and overbroad language, and furthermore was unnecessary
because federal criminal laws already provided sufficient
punishments for unlawful activities by activists targeting animal
enterprises.130 Consequently, they argued, the legislation would
have had a “chilling” effect on free speech, as animal advocates
would not be aware of what traditionally protected activities would
fall within the purview of the AETA. 131
After the AETA passed in the Senate, the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) changed its position on the legislation,
stating in a letter to the House Judiciary Committee that it would
not oppose the bill if minor but necessary changes were made to
make it less likely to threaten free speech.132 Specifically, the
ACLU stated that the bill should define “real or personal
property” as “tangible” property to avoid penalizing legitimate and
127

See, e.g., Caroline Fredrickson and Lisa Graves, ACLU, An Open Letter
to
Congress
(Mar.
6,
2006),
http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/gen/
25620leg20060306.html [hereinafter ACLU Open Letter]; National Lawyers
Guild, National Lawyers Guild Opposes Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (Oct.
30, 2006), http://www.nlg.org/news/statements/AETA_Act.htm [hereinafter
National Lawyers Guild]; Humane Society of the United States, Oppose the
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), http://www.hsus.org/webfiles/PDF/109_AETA_factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2007) [hereinafter
Humane Society].
128
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 133, 141–44.
129
ACLU Open Letter, supra note 127; National Lawyers Guild, supra
note 127; Humane Society, supra note 127.
130
ACLU Open Letter, supra note 127; National Lawyers Guild, supra
note 127; Humane Society, supra note 127.
131
ACLU Open Letter, supra note 127; National Lawyers Guild, supra
note 127; Humane Society, supra note 127.
132
Letter from Caroline Fredrickson and Lisa Graves, ACLU, to James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., House Judiciary Committee Chairman, and John Conyers,
Jr., House Judiciary Committee (Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ACLU Letter to
House], available at http://www.aclu.org/images/general/asset_upload_file809_
27356.pdf.
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otherwise legal activity that results in lost profits. 133 It further
advocated for clarification that a provision, which imposes a
penalty for actions that caused no reasonable fear of bodily harm,
no actual bodily injury or no economic damage, applied only to
conspiracies or attempts to violate the Act.134 These recommended
changes were not made, however, thereby keeping many forms of
previously accepted forms of activism within the purview of the
bill.135
Without further addressing these expressed concerns, on
November 13, 2006, House Judiciary Committee Chairman James
Sensenbrenner moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill.136 The
motion to suspend the rules was granted and the bill passed by
voice vote.137 With little or no dissent throughout these
proceedings, the AETA was signed into law by President Bush on
November 27, 2006.138
The final version of the AETA addresses the concerns of the
133

Id. at 1–2 (The ACLU suggested that the bill specify that it “does not
include damage or loss resulting from a boycott, protest, demonstration,
investigation, whistleblowing, reporting of animal mistreatment, or any public,
governmental, or business reaction to the disclosure of information concerning
animal enterprises.”).
134
Id. at 2–3. The ACLU stated that
[s]ince reasonable fear of bodily harm, actual bodily injury or economic
damages are all elements of crimes associated with more severe
penalties under the bill, we assume the first penalty provision under the
bill is meant to address conspiracies or attempts. However, this should
be clarified [t]o avoid the chilling effect on those individuals
considering actions that would cause no harm, either physical or
economic, nor instill any fear of harm. . . .
Id.
135

Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006).
Lib. Cong., THOMAS, Search Bill Summary and Status for the 109th
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/109search.html (search “Animal Enterprise
Terrorism Act”, select “S. 3880”, select “All Information”) (last accessed Feb.
21, 2008). Under this procedure, often used to act expeditiously on relatively
non-controversial legislation, floor debate is limited and all floor amendments
are prohibited. T HOMAS P. CARR, SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN THE HOUSE:
PRINCIPAL FEATURES (2004), http://www.rules.house.gov/Archives/98-314.pdf.
137
Lib. Cong., supra note 136.
138
Id.
136

848

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

industry groups and lobbyists that pushed for its passage.139 It
further expands the reach of federal animal enterprise legislation
and increases its penalties beyond those imposed by the AEPA as
amended in 2002.140 As a result, the legislation has become
excessively broad and vague, creating a chilling effect on activists’
exercise of constitutionally-protected speech.
1. AETA: Offenses
Through a series of amendments, the AETA has significantly
expanded the scope of “animal enterprise terrorism” beyond its
applicability under the AEPA. First, while the AEPA required that
an individual have the “purpose of causing physical disruption to
the functioning of an animal enterprise” for conduct to constitute a
violation, the AETA eliminates the previous limitation of physical
disruption and proscribes all conduct engaged in “for the purpose
of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal
enterprise.”141 In addition, Congress has taken steps to increase the
number of individuals and entities protected by the Act: the term
“animal enterprise” has been broadly redefined to include
essentially any industry or company that is involved in the
exploitation of animals, either directly or indirectly;142 and
“tertiary” targeting is included within its scope, expanding the
protections of the legislation far beyond those that fall within the
definition of an animal enterprise.143
139

See, e.g., 2004 Hearing, supra note 53 (testimony of William Green,
Senior V.P. and General Counsel, Chiron Corporation), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3462.
140
See discussion infra text accompanying notes 141–51.
141
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006)
(emphasis added).
142
Id. § 43(d)(1). The definition now encompasses: (1) commercial or
academic enterprises that use or sell animals or animal products for profit, food
or fiber production, agriculture, education, research, or testing; (2) zoos,
aquariums, animal shelters, pet stores, breeders, furriers, circuses, or rodeos, or
other lawful competitive animal events; and (3) any fair or similar event intended
to advance agricultural arts and sciences. Id.
143
Tertiary targets are defined as any “person or entity hav[ing] a
connection to, relationship with, or transactions with an animal enterprise.” Id.
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Finally, the AETA does not proscribe only physical or
economic disruption, but further prohibits individuals from
“intentionally plac[ing] a person in reasonable fear” of death or
serious bodily injury to that person, a member of their immediate
family, or their partner “by a course of conduct involving threats,
acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal trespass, harassment,
or intimidation.”144 In sum, the legislation now proscribes a broader
range of conduct when directed at a larger class of persons.
2. AETA: Penalties and Restitution
The AETA further increases the maximum penalties of the
AEPA.145 Most significantly, the punishment for a violation of the
Act, or attempt or conspiracy to violate the Act, is a fine,
imprisonment up to one year, or both if the offense does not instill
in another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death,
results in no bodily injury, and causes no economic damage or
economic damage not exceeding $10,000.146 In addition, a violation
under the AETA will result in a fine or imprisonment for up to five
years, or both, if no bodily injury occurs and the offense results in
economic damage between the amounts of $10,000 and
$100,000.147
§ 43(a)(2)(A).
144
Id. § 43(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
145
Id. § 43(b)(1).
146
Id. (“economic damage” is defined by § 43(d)(3) as “the replacement
costs of lost or damaged property or records, the costs of repeating an interrupted
or invalidated experiment, the loss of profits, or increased costs, including losses
and increased costs resulting from threats, acts or [sic] vandalism, property
damage, trespass, harassment, or intimidation taken against a person or entity
on account of that person’s or entity’s connection to, relationship with, or
transactions with the animal enterprise.”). The AEPA did not provide for any
penalty in the absence of economic damage and created a maximum of six
months imprisonment for causing damage not exceeding $10,000. Animal
Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(1) (West 2008) (as amended in
2002).
147
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(2) (2006). The
AEPA previously provided for a maximum penalty of three years in prison for
these violations, rather than five. Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18
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Furthermore, like the AEPA, restitution under the AETA may
include costs for repeating any experimentation that was
interrupted or invalidated as a result of the offense, as well as for
the loss of food production or farm income.148 However, the third
catch-all category for “any other economic damage resulting from
the offense”149 now expressly includes any losses or costs caused
by economic disruption.150 Thus, while the revisions to these
sections have increased the penalties and restitution for conduct
that constituted “animal enterprise terrorism” under the AEPA, the
amended sections primarily address Congress’ subsequent concern
with economic loss.151
D. The Applicability of Terrorism Sentencing Enhancements to
“Animal Enterprise Terrorism”
Another tool that the federal government has attempted to use
to deter individuals from engaging in direct action is the “terrorism”
sentencing enhancement in the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(the “Guidelines”).152 Section 3A1.4(a) of the Guidelines provides
for significantly increased sentences if an offense was “a felony
that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of
terrorism.”153 If applied, the enhancement more than doubles the
length of a sentence authorized by the initial sentencing guideline
range.154
U.S.C.A. § 43(b)(2) (West 2008) (as amended in 2002).
148
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(c)(1)–(2) (2006).
149
Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 43(c)(3) (West 2008)
(as amended in 2002); Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3)
(2006).
150
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3) (2006).
151
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 115–50.
152
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4.
153
Id. A “federal crime of terrorism” is defined as an offense that “is
calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct” and falls under one of the
many categories enumerated by the statute. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5).
154
United States v. Thurston, Nos. CR 06-60069-01-AA, CR 06-6007001-AA, CR 06-60071-01-AA, CR 06-60078-01-AA, CR 06-60079-01-AA, CR
06-60080-01-AA, CR 06-60120-01-AA, CR 06-60122-01-AA, CR 06-60122-
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In United States v. Thurston, an Oregon District Court ruled
that terrorism enhancement penalties may apply to direct action by
animal and environmental rights activists.155 However, while “the
government retains the prosecutorial discretion to request the
enhancement,”156 it will not be applied liberally.157 The court noted
that because of the substantial increase that the enhancement may
provide to a relatively short sentence, the government must meet a
high burden of proof.158 That is, in order for the enhancement to
apply, the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the offenses of conviction involved, or were intended
to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.159 In addition, if “the
government is overreaching due to political considerations, either
the enhancement will not apply to defendants’ offenses or
defendants will be eligible for a downward departure because their
conduct is outside the ‘heartland’ of terrorism offenses.”160
Perhaps the greatest protection that animal rights activists have
from this enhancement being applied to instances of direct action is
02-AA, CR 06-60123-01-AA, CR 06-60124-01-AA, CR 06-60125-01-AA, CR
06-60126-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176, at *19 (D. Or. May 21, 2007).
155
Id. at *20.
156
Id. at *18.
157
See infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
158
Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *19.
159
Id. at *1.
160
Id. at *18. It is noteworthy that the Thurston court prefaced its decision
by writing that it was not “appropriate for the court to speculate whether the
government seeks to promote a particular political agenda or to punish a
particular form of activism in requesting the terrorism enhancement.” Id. at *1.
The court likely included this statement because the government appears to have
sought these penalty enhancements not because of the defendants’ criminal
conduct, but because of their political beliefs. While the FBI states that
“[t]errorism is terrorism—no matter what the motive,” Robert S. Mueller, FBI
Director, Remarks at the Operation Backfire Press Conference (Jan. 20, 2006),
accessed at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller012006.htm, it hasn’t
sought “terrorism enhancement” for church arsons or the murders of abortion
providers. Will Potter, Government Seeks “Terrorism Enhancement” for
Environmental Activists, http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/2007/05/11/
terrorism-enhancement-hearing/ (May 11, 2007). In fact, “the enhancement has
not [even] been sought . . . in prosecutions of persons who possessed biological
toxins.” Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *18.
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that the federal crime of terrorism requires that actions be
calculated “‘to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct.’ Thus, the government must establish that the defendants
targeted government conduct rather than the conduct of private
individuals or corporations.”161 Animal rights activists that use
direct action tactics, such as the SHAC 7, target solely
corporations and their affiliates that engage in the institutionalized
exploitation of nonhuman animals in an attempt to make it
unprofitable or inconvenient for the businesses to continue their
practices; they do not target government entities or engage in home
demonstrations of governmental employees.162 In fact, the term
“direct action” refers to the fact that activists target the source of
their concerns directly, rather than attempting to affect change
indirectly through governmental means.163 Accordingly, although
terrorism sentencing enhancements may be applicable to
defendants convicted of “eco-terrorism” offenses, 164 federal
prosecutors face several obstacles in meeting their relatively high
burden of proof.

161

Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *15 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(A)).
162
See, e.g., Potter supra note 160 (Illegal direction action is not “meant
to influence government, because the [activists have] lost all faith that
government could be influenced.”).
163
See supra text accompanying notes 32–52.
164
Thurston, 2007 WL 1500176, at *1.
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee.165
- Hon. Byron Raymond White
A. Boundaries of the Protections of Free Speech
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”166 However, the
protection afforded by the First Amendment is not absolute and
may be regulated when speech is “of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”167
Two such narrowly tailored exceptions that the Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized are where speech constitutes a “true
threat,”168 or where it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”169 In
addition, lower courts have, on occasion, determined that crimefacilitating speech is not protected by the First Amendment.170

165

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 395 U.S. 367, 390

(1969).
166

U.S. C ONST . AMEND . I.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
168
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
169
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
170
See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, a 130 page book
of detailed factual instructions on how to murder and to become a professional
killer, was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment).
167
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1. True Threats: The Requirement of Subjective Intent

The First Amendment does not exclude all potentially
threatening speech from its protections. 171 Instead, in Virginia v.
Black,172 the Supreme Court held that only “true threats” may be
banned under the First Amendment.173 “‘True threats’ encompass
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”174 The
Court further noted that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a
speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”175
While it is not required that the speaker subjectively intends to
carry out the threatened action for the speech to be punishable,176
the Court adopted a separate standard of subjective intent—it must
be shown that the speaker intentionally threatened the individual or
group of individuals.177 This prohibition is not merely intended to
171

See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706–07 (holding that defendant’s statement,
“[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
[the president,]” was not a true threat but was constitutionally protected speech).
The First Amendment protects “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks” as well as speech that is “vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” Id.
at 708.
172
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
173
Id. at 359.
174
Id.
175
Id.at 360.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 359. “The [Black] Court’s insistence on intent to threaten as the
sine qua non of a constitutionally punishable threat is especially clear from its
ultimate holding that the [state] statute was unconstitutional precisely because
the element of intent was effectively eliminated . . . .” United States v. Cassel,
408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005). Several circuit courts have modified their
analysis of true threats to require this specific intent to threaten. See, e.g., id.
(“[Black] embraces not only the requirement that the communication itself be
intentional, but also the requirement that the speaker intend for his language to
threaten the victim.”); United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Unprotected by the Constitution are threats that communicate the
speaker’s intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against identifiable
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protect individuals from the possibility that the threatened violence
will transpire, but also from the fear of violence and “disruption
that fear engenders.”178 Thus, society’s interest in protecting
threatening speech is secondary to that of maintaining a system of
order and civility. 179
2. Incitement: Advocacy of Unlawful Action and the Requirement of
Imminence
In the absence of a “true threat,” determining whether advocacy
of violence or lawless action falls outside the purview of the
protections of the First Amendment becomes even more complex.
Although the Supreme Court has held that advocacy is
constitutionally protected if it is not directed or likely to incite
imminent illegal acts, 180 the Court has not offered significant
guidance on the meaning of “imminent.”181 Recent cases, however,
suggest that this standard is difficult to meet if illegal acts do not
immediately follow the speech in question.182
Supreme Court opinions of the early twentieth century held
that a State may reasonably and constitutionally conclude that
certain instances of advocacy create such a danger to the public
peace and security that they should be penalized by the use of
State police power.183 However, in many of those cases, Justices
individuals.”); Vives v. City of New York, 405 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir.
2005).
178
Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 388 (1992)).
179
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
180
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
181
Joanne Kirchner, Threatening Abortion Providers, Inciting Violence, or
Exercising First Amendment Rights? Chapter 486 Takes a Precarious Stand,
38 MCGEORGE L. REV . 159, 171 (2007).
182
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
183
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (affirming the
conviction of Anita Whitney, found guilty of violating the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act for her role as an organizing member of the Communist Labor
Party); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Espionage Act, the Court upheld the
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Holmes and Brandeis dissented from the reasoning of the
majority, 184 defending the freedom of speech, stressing the
distinction between advocacy and incitement, and supporting a
requirement of a showing of “clear and present danger.”185 Thus,
they advocated that for speech to no longer be protected, “it must
be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected
or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to
believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.”186
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Warren Court
rejected previous restrictions on the exercise of free speech, and
gradually adopted the Holmes-Brandeis requirement of the
expectation of immediate violence.187 In 1969, this rationale was
adopted in Brandenberg v. Ohio,188 and the reasoning of prior
cases was expressly overruled.189
After accepting an invitation from Brandenberg, the leader of a
Ku Klux Klan group, a reporter and cameraman from a local
television station attended a Ku Klux Klan gathering and filmed the
events.190 On the basis of this gathering, Brandenberg was
conviction of defendant for printing materials intended to incite and advocate
resistance to the United States in the war with Germany).
184
See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J. concurring); Abrams, 250
U.S. at 624 (1919) (Holmes, J. in dissent).
185
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
186
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis further explained that “no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion. If there be time [for discussion], the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.” Id. at 377.
187
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 n.5 (1951)
(listing nine opinions that “have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis
rationale”); American Communications Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
412 (1950) (The First Amendment “requires that one be permitted to advocate
what he will unless there is a clear and present danger that a substantial public
evil will result.”).
188
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
189
Id. at 449.
190
Id. at 445. The film revealed twelve hooded figures, some of whom were
armed, gathered around a large wooden cross which they eventually burned. Id.
Portions of the film were later shown both on local and national television
networks. Id. While most of the dialogue in the scene was unintelligible in the
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convicted of violating an Ohio statute prohibiting the advocacy of
unlawful acts “as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform.”191 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments because it failed to distinguish mere
advocacy “from incitement to imminent lawless action.”192 Thus,
even advocacy of the use of force or to violate the law are
protected from State prohibition by the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and press, so long as that advocacy is not directed or
likely to incite or produce imminent illegal acts. 193
The Court has yet to expressly provide a clearly defined rule
for determining when advocacy incites violence and thus may be
prohibited by the First Amendment.194 However, two recent cases
involving the incitement requirement have found that the harm
threatened by the defendant’s speech was not sufficiently
imminent for the speech to be to be proscribed.195 In the first case,
Hess v. Indiana,196 approximately one hundred protestors moved
onto a public street and blocked vehicle traffic during an anti-war
demonstration.197 When police caused the demonstrators to

film, scattered phrases could be understood, such as “bury the niggers” and “we
intend to do our part.” Id. at 446 n.1.
191
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. Brandenberg was charged with
violating an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
2923.13 (West 2008), for “advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform” and for “voluntarily assembling
with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate
the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Upon
conviction, he was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years’
imprisonment. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45.
192
Id. at 448–49.
193
Id. at 447.
194
See Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of
the First Amendment, 61 O HIO ST . L.J. 1175, 1214 (2000).
195
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
196
414 U.S. 105.
197
Id. at 106.
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disperse,198 Hess said loudly, “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later
(or again).”199 The Supreme Court concluded that this statement
was not intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the
crowd in the vicinity of Hess, nor likely to produce such action.200
The opinion noted, “[a]t best . . . the statement could be taken as
counsel for present moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time.”201 Thus, the Court held that these actions were not sufficient
to permit the State to punish Hess for his speech.202
In the second case, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,203
white business owners who had suffered lost earnings as result of
civil rights boycotts brought actions against the participants and
civil rights organizations.204 In a series of speeches, NAACP
chapter leader Charles Evers stated that boycott violators “would
be watched”205 and “disciplined” by their own people.206
Subsequently, those individuals were unlawfully disciplined.207
Conceding that “[i]n the passionate atmosphere in which the
speeches were delivered, they might have been understood as
inviting an unlawful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to
create a fear of violence,” the Court held that “[t]he emotionally
198

Id.
Id.
200
Id. at 109.
201
Id. at 108.
202
Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
203
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
204
Id. at 889–90.
205
Id. at 900 n.28.
206
Id. at 902. Evers further warned violators that the Sheriff could not sleep
with them at night and that if any African-American was caught “in any of them
racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.” Id. The names of those who
violated the boycott were then read at meetings of the local chapter of the
NAACP and were published in a paper entitled the “Black Times.” Id. at 903–
04.
207
Evidence adduced at trial illustrated that shots were fired at the homes of
three violators, Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 904–05, a brick was thrown through the
windshield of a car, id. at 904, a flower garden was intentionally damaged, id. at
904, automobile tires were slashed, id. at 906, and two individuals were
physically attacked, id. at 905.
199
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charged rhetoric of Charles Evers’ speeches did not transcend the
bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg.”208 Essential
to this determination was that the violence allegedly caused by
Evers’s rhetoric occurred weeks and months after his speeches
were made.209
In light of Brandenberg and its progeny, the Court has
interpreted the First Amendment broadly and set forth expansive
protections of advocacy speech.210 The resulting standard of
imminence is a narrow one: “speech intended to stir anger and even
speech that creates a climate of violence is protected under the
First Amendment.”211 Thus, statements which advocate illegal
action at some indefinite point in the future are insufficient to
permit State proscription of speech.212 This stringent standard for
imminence is particularly significant given the widespread
knowledge of contemporary technology and the increasing use of
the internet as a tool to express dissatisfaction with societal norms
and disseminate related information.213
208

Id. at 927–28.
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928.
210
See Vitiello, supra note 194, at 1216–17.
First, when speech values are at stake, a court has a heightened duty to
review the record independently to determine whether the findings
below are justified. Second, the Court will not lightly find that
threatened harm is imminent, at least not absent a showing that the
threatened harm has come shortly after the speech. Third, a state must
prove the speaker’s intent to bring about the harm; the Court will read
ambiguous evidence of the speaker’s intent in favor of the speaker. The
Court requires intent, not mere knowledge, that the harm will occur.
209

Id.
211

Jason Schlosberg, Judgment on “Nuremberg”: An Analysis of Free
Speech and Anti-Abortion Threats Made on the Internet, 7 B.U. J. SCI. &
T ECH. L. 52, 74 (2001) (citing Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 926-32).
212
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
213
See e.g., The Final Nail, http://www.finalnail.com/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2008) (providing address and contact information for laboratory animal
suppliers, fur farms, slaughterhouses and companies that trap animals for fur);
Close HLS, http://www.closehls.net/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (posting
reports of demonstrations and providing addresses and contact information for
HLS customers, lab suppliers, and financial affiliates); SHAC, http://www.
shac.net/HLS/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) (posting detailed
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3. Crime-Facilitating Speech

“Crime-facilitating speech” is another area in which courts have
been willing to restrict the exercise of free speech.214 This term
refers to any communication that, intentionally or not, conveys
information that makes it easier or safer for some listeners or
readers to commit unlawful acts or to get away with committing
them.215 The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly determine when
such speech is constitutionally protected,216 and lower courts have
not set forth any discernible rule in their unpredictable decisions.217
Crime-facilitating speech is often a form of “dual-use” material
that can be used both in harmful ways and in legitimate ones.218
Thus, when attempting to generate a rule to regulate such speech, it
is important that only the harmful uses are proscribed.219 Noting
that “[m]uch crime-facilitating speech can educate readers, or give
them practical information that they can use lawfully[,]” Professor
information compiled from the undercover investigations in HLS laboratories
and a listing of HLS clients). While much of this information was also
contained on the SHAC USA website, the primary distinction is that these
websites do not post anonymous communiqués of illegal direct action and less,
if any, personal information of company officials.
214
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN . L. REV. 1095
(2005); see, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a book of instructions on how to become a professional killer was
not entitled to First Amendment protection); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d
835 (9th Cir. 1982) (the publication and wide distribution of instructions on
how to make illegal drugs is not entitled to protection of the First Amendment).
215
Volokh, supra note 214, at 1103.
216
Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (“Our cases have not yet considered whether, and if so to
what extent, the First Amendment protects such instructional speech.”).
217
Compare United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (8th Cir. 2000) (a
permanent injunction prohibiting the sale of a program that provided
instructions for avoiding federal income taxation did not violate promoters’ First
Amendment right to free speech), with McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 631
(9th Cir. 2002) (advising street gang members with a “blueprint on how a
successful gang should be run” is protected by the First Amendment), cert.
denied Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993 (2002).
218
Volokh, supra note 214, at 1126–27.
219
Id. at 1127.
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Eugene Volokh, Professor of Law at UCLA Law School and the
author of The First Amendment and Related Statutes,220 has set
forth a balancing test, advocating that there should be an exception
to First Amendment protections where at least one of the following
three circumstances is present:
1. When the speech is said to a few people who the speaker
knows are likely to use it to commit a crime or to escape
punishment (classic aiding and abetting, criminal facilitation,
or obstruction of justice): This speech, unlike speech that’s
broadly published, is unlikely to have noncriminal value to
its listeners. It’s thus harmful, [and] it lacks First
Amendment value. . . .
2. When the speech, even though broadly published, has
virtually no noncriminal uses . . . . This speech is likewise
harmful and lacks First Amendment value. . .
3. When the speech facilitates extraordinarily serious harms,
such as nuclear or biological attacks: This speech is so
harmful that it ought to be restricted even though it may
have First Amendment value.221
These narrow exceptions balance the significant values of
protecting the right of free speech and prohibiting “speech that
substantially facilitates crime.”222
B. Free Speech, the Internet, and the SHAC 7
The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to
punish the person engaging in it. It would be remarkable to
hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information
can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-lawabiding third party.223
- Hon. John Paul Stevens
220

EUGENE VOLOKH, T HE F IRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES

(2005).
221
222
223

Volokh, supra note 214, at 1217.
Id. at 1111, 1217.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–30 (2001).
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A law is “unconstitutionally broad [if] it authorizes the
punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.”224 Accordingly,
the most problematic aspect of the SHAC 7 convictions concerns
the defendants’ rights to freedom of speech and association.225 It is
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the convictions of the
SHAC 7 with the protections of the First Amendment. United
States Attorney Christopher Christie stated in an interview that
the defendants were “exhorting and encouraging” actions not
protected by free speech guarantees.226 However, upon application
of the First Amendment jurisprudence standards set forth above to
the content of the SHAC USA website, the defendants do not
appear to have engaged in any conduct that falls outside the
purview of First Amendment protections.
1. True Threat
The information posted on the SHAC USA website did not
constitute a “true threat,” as it did not “communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.”227 At trial, an HLS
employee who visited the SHAC USA website as part of his
employment with the company recited postings from the site
reporting on nation-wide protests and illegal actions by unknown
individuals against HLS and its affiliates.228 Significantly, the pages
that reported these events also contained a disclaimer, stating that
the group did not direct, control or participate in the protests.229
224

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
Best & Kahn, supra note 93, at 19.
226
Michael Taylor & Jim Herron Zamora, Stalking Charges Against
Animal Rights Activists, S.F. C HRON ., May 27, 2004, at A5.
227
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
228
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 17, United States v. Kevin Kjonaas, No.
06-4339 (3d Cir. filed Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Kjonaas Brief].
229
Id.; United States v. Carmichael, 326 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1281 (M.D.
Ala. 2004) (in holding that the First Amendment rights of the defendant
precluded the court from ordering him to take down a website containing the
pictures and personal information of government agents and informants, the court
noted that a disclaimer of intent is evidence that the website would not
reasonably be threatening to those individuals).
225
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The same employee testified that he viewed the posting of “Top
20 Terror Tactics.”230 However, this document was not written by
anyone affiliated with SHAC USA; rather, it was re-posted from
the website of an organization that compiled the list to garner
support against the SHAC campaign.231 In fact, the heading of that
page clearly stated that the list was taken from another source, and
it contained a disclaimer “making it clear that SHAC did not
organize or take part in any criminal activity.”232 Neither these
postings nor the remainder of the information contained on the
website communicated a subjective intent to commit violent acts
against anyone affiliated with HLS.233
230

Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 16. To view SHAC USA’s posting of
these nineteen tactics, visit: http://web.archive.org/web/20010502223703/http:
//www.shacusa.net/news/3-6-01.html. The government contended that this
document implicitly encouraged the invading of offices, vandalizing property and
stealing documents; physical assault, including spraying cleaning fluid into
someone’s eyes; smashing windows of a target’s home or flooding the home
while the individual was away; vandalizing or firebombing cars and bomb
hoaxes; and threatening telephone calls or letters, including threats to kill or
injure someone’s partner or children. Press Release, United States Attorney’s
Office–District of New Jersey, Three Militant Animal Rights Activists
Sentenced to Between Four and Six Years in Prison 4 (Sept. 12, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/ shac0912rel.pdf.
231
Josh Harper, Seven HLS Campaign Volunteers Arrested by FBI,
Charged with Terrorism, 24 NO COMPROMISE, http://nocompromise.org/
issues/24shac7.html. The list of tactics was originally written by the Research
Defence Society, “a British lobby group reportedly funded by the pharmaceutical
industry and universities. Its main focus is to disseminate information about,
and to defend the use of, animal testing in medicine.” Research Defence Society,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_Defence_Society (last visited Nov. 29,
2007).
232
Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 16–17. The top of the list read:
“From the Research Defense Society of the U.K.” Id.
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The SHAC USA website acted only as an information clearinghouse,
and the defendants themselves never indicated that they were going to take part
in any actions. In fact, the organization “never advocated for anyone to be hurt”
and the bottom of every webpage contained “a disclaimer that said that [they] do
not advocate any form of violent activity, and in fact, [they] urge people that
when they write letters or they send emails, that they’re polite, they’re to the
point, they’re not threatening in nature.” Democracy Now! Interview, supra note
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Furthermore, the actions of the defendants cannot be
considered intimidation “in the constitutionally proscribable sense
of the word,” as there is no indication that the defendants directed a
threat to any individual with the intent of placing them in fear of
bodily harm or death.234 As the SHAC 7 defendant(s) argued, at
most, the evidence showed only that
animal rights activists intended to make the lives of these
individuals miserable by relentlessly demonstrating in front
of their homes, causing them embarrassment and emotional
distress and great inconvenience, with the knowledge that
this disruption of their lives would continue so long as their
associations with HLS continued.235
However, “[s]peech does not lose its protected character . . .
simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into
action.”236
2. Incitement
Likewise, the maintenance of the SHAC USA website was not
directed or likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action.237 A
claim that certain statements are not protected by the Constitution
because they incite unlawful action “would be increasingly difficult
if made against communications via the Web . . . [as] the indirect
communicative nature of the Internet provides a strong buffer
between a speaker and a threatened target.”238 Nonetheless, the
234

Id. at 360; cf. United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that a known anti-abortion activist’s actions were a true threat where
he parked two Ryder trucks at an abortion clinic, knowing that the clinicians
were aware that a similar one had been used in the Oklahoma City bombing and
would fear for their lives); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette,
Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that in creating “Guilty” posters and a website where the personal information of
abortion providers was disclosed, the actions of an anti-abortion organization
constituted true “threats of force” because they intentionally replicated a pattern
that preceded the past murders of three providers).
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case against the SHAC 7 was based primarily on the theory that
the maintenance of the SHAC USA website “encouraged and
incited SHAC members and followers to direct their intimidation,
harassment and violence against HLS and its targeted employees, as
well as secondary targets . . . in an often successful attempt to get
those companies to end their business relationships with HLS.”239
The evidence presented by the government at trial consisted of
the testimony of employees and former employees of HLS and its
affiliates detailing instances of harassment, vandalism and property
damage.240 The government also presented evidence obtained from
the investigation of the defendants conducted by the FBI and other
law enforcement officers.241 However, this evidence failed to
demonstrate either that any of the defendants participated in or
directed others to participate in criminal activity, 242 or that the
criminal activity that occurred was an imminent result of the
defendants’ conduct.243 In fact, vandalism and property damage at
homes and offices sometimes “occurred within days or weeks of
SHAC USA’s postings . . . but on other occasions the
Government’s evidence demonstrated no link at all between
postings and the actions of anonymous third parties, either because

Judge Kozinski in dissent noted that there was so little chance of proving that
the posters and website in that case met the imminency requirement in
Brandenberg that the plaintiffs did not even raise the argument.” United States
v. Carmichael, 326 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1287 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (citing Planned
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1092 n.5 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
239
U.S. Attorney’s Press Release, supra note 107.
240
Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 10. For example, the Chairman of the
holding company for HLS testified that he received offensive phone calls and
mail, pictures of him labeled “puppy killer” were posted at his daughter’s
apartment building, his California home was vandalized, and there were protests
outside of his New York apartment. Id. at 20. He further testified that he did not
know who was responsible for these actions, some of which were lawful protest
activity. Id.
241
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5–6, United States v. Andrew Stepanian,
No. 06-4296 (3d Cir. filed Sept. 29, 2006) (this evidence included “surveillance
of speaking events, protests, demonstrations, marches, electronic surveillance of
the website as well as phone conversations”).
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Kjonaas Brief, supra note 228, at 12.
243
Id. at 15.
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the activity occurred before the postings, or months later.”244 The
link between the speech and the conduct was further weakened
because the SHAC USA website was often not the exclusive source
of the information it contained.245 Thus, the government failed to
show the requisite temporal nexus for the proscription of speech
under this exception to the First Amendment’s protections.246 At
worst, the website amounted to nothing more than advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time, which the Supreme
Court has held to be protected speech.247
3. Crime-Facilitating Speech
Finally, there is no overarching policy rationale for proscribing
the SHAC 7’s conduct as impermissible crime-facilitating
speech.248 In fact, as a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether the
maintenance of the SHAC USA website facilitated the commission
of any crime as is required to fall within the possible exception to
First Amendment protected speech.249 While the website posted
reports of what had occurred on prior occasions and provided the
location for possible targets of protest, it did not provide specific
instructions making it easier for its visitors to commit unlawful acts
244

Id.
Id. at 13 (“Even the Government’s witness admitted . . . that there were
other animal activist websites which publicized protest information.”). In fact,
prosecutors called an activist to the stand who had participated in electronic civil
disobedience (“ECD”) against an affiliate of HLS. SHAC7.com, The Case,
supra note 96; see Wikipedia, Electronic Civil Disobedience, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_civil_disobedience (last visited Nov. 25, 2007)
(ECD refers to a form of protest in which the participants use computer
technology to carry out their actions, such as flooding a computer server with
external communications requests, rendering it unable to respond to legitimate
traffic). The activist testified that SHAC USA had not at all encouraged him to
take these actions, and that he read about these tactics of common knowledge on
a number of websites. SHAC7.com, The Case, supra note 96.
246
See Vitiello, supra note 194 and accompanying text.
247
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or get away with committing them.250
However, even assuming that such information can be said to
constitute crime-facilitating speech, the information contained on
the SHAC USA website does not fall within the any of the three
proscribable circumstances posited by Professor Volokh.251 First,
the website was not available only to a few people which the
defendants knew were likely to use the information to commit
unlawful acts.252 The very nature of the Internet is such that its
content is available to billions of individuals, accessible at any given
moment. Second, the information posted was relevant for
noncriminal use.253 In fact, the personal information posted about
individuals who are affiliated with HLS was used for lawful
purposes in this case.254 Lastly, it is evident that the information
provided could not facilitate extraordinarily serious harms, such as
nuclear or biological attacks.255 Thus, due to the First Amendment
value of the information contained on the SHAC USA website and
its inability to result in serious harm, the conduct of the SHAC 7
was likely insufficient to constitute proscribable crime-facilitating
speech.
In sum, the maintenance of the SHAC USA website did not fall
within any of the exceptions necessary to proscribe the
fundamental freedom of speech: the information it contained did
not communicate the requisite intent to constitute a true threat; it
was not directed or likely to incite or produce imminent lawless
action; and it could not be proscribed as crime-facilitating speech.
Accordingly, the convictions of the SHAC 7 for conspiracy to
violate the AEPA were not in accordance with the First
Amendment.
250
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C. A “Chilling” Effect on the Right to Free Speech

“[A] statute which . . . forbids . . . the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law.”256 Michael Ratner, a human rights
lawyer and vice-president of the Center for Constitutional Rights,
noted that the AETA and its precursors are unique forms of
legislation, the vagueness of which “sweep within them basically
every environmental and animal-rights organization in the
country.”257 Even under the USA Patriot Act, 258 which has come
under attack by virtually all concerned with the preservation of
civil liberties,259 the definition of domestic terrorism requires that
an offense include “acts dangerous to human life,”260 a defining
element entirely absent from “eco-terrorism” legislation.
The problematic vagueness of the AEPA became apparent in
the aftermath of the SHAC 7 convictions. “[T]he terms of a penal
statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties. . . .”261 This Note argues that the
AEPA lacked this requisite clarity. The Act provided that
whoever, for the purpose of causing physical disruption to an
animal enterprise, intentionally damaged or caused the loss of any
property used by that enterprise or conspired to do so, was in
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Karen Charman, Environmentalists = Terrorists, T OM PAINE.COM , May
8, 2003, http://www.tompaine.com/Archive/scontent/7748.html.
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violation of the statute.262 This language indicates that only
physical disruption of an animal enterprise itself, and not economic
disruption caused by the targeting of affiliated individuals and
businesses, was prohibited by the statute. Nevertheless, the SHAC
7 defendants were convicted of animal enterprise terrorism for
allegedly conspiring with other activists to target the employees
and affiliates of HLS.263
Neither the exercise of the speech at issue, nor the conduct that
allegedly resulted from the speech, was explicitly proscribed by the
statute.264 In fact, a chief concern of those discontented with the
AEPA’s protections, and one of the primary bases for the support
of its amendment, was that it did not address secondary or tertiary
targeting by activists. 265 Accordingly, the AETA expanded the
scope of the Act to explicitly include such conduct. Because
Congress felt it was necessary to amend the Act in such a manner,
it may be inferred that such conduct was not previously intended
to be proscribed.266 However, even if the Act had been intended to
address these issues, these lobbying efforts demonstrate that “men
of common intelligence” necessarily guessed at its meaning and
differed as to its application, thereby resulting in a violation of due
process as applied.267
The conscious and intentional inclusion of disclaimers
throughout the SHAC USA website clearly illustrate that the
SHAC 7 defendants outwardly engaged in conduct which they
believed to be legal.268 Consequently, these convictions have caused
uncertainty in the minds of animal advocates, some of whom will
262
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263
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266
See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989) (“Where the words of a later
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inevitably be deterred from engaging in legal activism out of fear
that they may end up in federal prison.269 As a result, even if
animal enterprise terrorism legislation is not actively used for
prosecution, “the very risk of being charged as a terrorist will
almost certainly have a chilling effect on legitimate activism.”270
With the introduction of the AETA, Congress was given the
opportunity to clarify the scope of animal enterprise terrorism
legislation. However, although the passage of the AETA resolved
the incongruity with respect to secondary targeting, it has created
additional issues that are unlikely to be resolved at least until its
first application. First, while the AEPA required that an individual
have the purpose of causing physical disruption to an animal
enterprise, the AETA creates a violation for those who act “for the
purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an
animal enterprise.”271 The use of such vague language widens the
scope of the Act greatly, potentially encompassing purely
economic damage, civil disobedience and other forms of activism
that are generally accepted.272 The penalties provision of the
legislation further supports such an expansive interpretation, as it
provides a punishment for an offense that does not instill in
another the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death, results
in no bodily injury, and results in no economic damage.273
Significantly, the AETA also extends the crime of animal
enterprise terrorism to situations in which an individual
“intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of death or serious
bodily injury” for the purpose of “damaging or interfering with the
operations of an animal enterprise.”274 Though it is uncontroversial
269
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that individuals should not be threatened with such harm, there
may be a potential and significant problem with the intent
requirement if not interpreted narrowly by the judiciary. Those
who have supported the passage of the AETA have begun a
“scare-mongering campaign” to create a fear of “eco-terrorists” in
the public.275 Such efforts, coupled with the fact that activists have
been named “the number one domestic terrorism threat” by the
members of the federal government,276 creates a “climate of fear”
where the objectively reasonable individual may begin to fear
nonviolent activists. 277
By interpreting the law to require specific intent to place a
person in fear of death or serious bodily injury, courts may shield
innocent and lawful behavior from criminal sanction.278 However, if
the statutory requirement is construed to be one of general intent—
whether the individual intended to engage in acts of vandalism,
property damage, criminal trespass, or intimidation or conspired to
do so—the statute may impermissibly infringe upon
constitutionally protected freedoms or, at best, undesirably
sanction methods of civil disobedience regularly employed in social
justice movements as terrorism.279
275
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Finally, the illusory exemptions contained in the AETA are
unsuccessful in alleviating these concerns regarding the scope of the
legislation. The drafters included a section entitled “Rules of
Construction,” stating:
Nothing in this section shall be construed—(1) to prohibit
any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or
other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal
prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) to create new remedies for interference with activities
protected by the free speech or free exercise clauses of the
First Amendment to the Constitution, regardless of the
point of view expressed, or to limit any existing legal
remedies for such interference; or (3) to provide exclusive
criminal penalties or civil remedies with respect to the
conduct prohibited by this action, or to preempt State or
local laws that may provide such penalties or remedies. 280
However, these provisions do not serve the same purpose as the
amendments recommended by the ACLU in its letter to the House
Judiciary Committee to make the bill less likely to chill or threaten
free speech.281 In fact, these provisions state nothing more than the
elementary proposition that a statute may not override a
Constitutional right.282 Despite the drafter’s alleged precautionary
measures, the AETA should not survive a constitutional
challenge.283
It is unlikely that the AETA will stop the underground, illegal
direct action that it was allegedly designed to prevent. 284 Property
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damage, vandalism, harassment, intimidation, and any other acts
that aggressive animal rights activists may commit in furtherance of
their goals that are not entitled to protection under the First
Amendment were plainly unlawful even prior to this ideologyspecific legislation.285 The presence of penalties for these actions
has never been a deterrent in the past, 286 and their increase is not
likely to significantly influence a decision to engage in illegal direct
action.287
Despite activists’ resilience in the past, these further sanctions
are likely to deter aboveground activists who attend protests and
publicly voice their dissent, resulting in one of two possible
undesirable outcomes. First, these individuals may fear expressing
their opinions and their desire for change, thereby inhibiting the
crucial “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” rationale behind the First
Amendment.288 In contrast, other individuals may be persuaded to
resort to clandestine activities and simply hope that they will not
be caught.289 An examination of ALF activities and those of the
285
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Addressing the court at his sentencing on November 8th, 2005, Peter
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of 8,000 mink from those farms. I regret it was only 8,000. It is my
understanding of those 6 farms, only 2 of them have since shut down. I
regret it was only 2. More than anything, I regret my restraint, because
whatever damage we did to those businesses, if those farms were left
standing, and if one animal was left behind, then it wasn’t enough.
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SHAC 7 reveals that it is perhaps a greater risk to post information
on a website than to put on all black attire and a balaclava, travel to
a fur farm or animal testing facility, and proceed to destroy
thousands of dollars worth of equipment and release animals from
captivity. The freedom to communicate one’s ideas without fear of
prosecution is essential to diminish the belief that illegal direct
action is the most effective means to prevent the death of
nonhuman animals.
CONCLUSION
The convictions of the SHAC 7 should not be perceived as
merely affecting the contemporary animal rights movement because
the legal implications that arise from branding activists as
“terrorists” concern all individuals who advocate political and
social change.290 The SHAC campaign, as well as other animal
rights organizations that engage in direct action, have developed
effective strategies and methodological approaches to activism that
are highly significant for all matters of social justice, advocacy and
political struggle.291
When Congress creates legislation to proscribe the actions of
advocates for one side of a debate, it must cautiously avoid
silencing the discussion and dissent so fundamental to the
significance of the First Amendment.292 The AEPA, as first passed
in 1992, appears to have been drafted to effectively balance the
competing interests of activists and the federal government. 293 The
text of the legislation protected animal rights advocacy by
proscribing a relatively narrow range of activities, while also
recognizing the governmental interest of protecting corporate
interests from theft, vandalism and physical disruption.294
However, application of and amendments to this legislation have
little incentive to remain ‘above ground’ with one’s identity revealed.”).
290
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291
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292
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progressively tipped the scale in favor of corporate interests.295 By
appealing to the unrelenting lobbying efforts of industry groups,
Congress has effectively disregarded the concern for protection of
the legitimate activities of grassroots activists.296 Accepting the
industry’s unsupported claims that further measures were
necessary to criminalize already illegal activities, Congress adopted
the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, a statute that not only failed
to address the problems inherent in the AEPA’s revisions, but
expanded the protections of those profiting from animal
exploitation in terms even more vague and overbroad.297
In light of the SHAC 7 convictions and the passage of the
AETA, it is necessary for Congress to reexamine the purposes for
which it serves. At the start of each new Congress, representatives
must “solemnly swear that [they] will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States.”298 Accordingly, if it is
encouraged that a proposed bill be passed to proscribe criminal
conduct, Congress must make some concerted effort to verify that
the bill would accomplish that end without infringing upon
fundamental freedoms. In adopting legislation that impermissibly
proscribes activities traditionally protected by the First
Amendment, Congress abandons its duty to defend the
Constitution.

295

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 89–151.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 165–289.
297
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 256–89.
298
U.S. Senate, Oath of Office, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Oath_Office.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
296

